Scam Call Centre Networks

Ukraine and associated operations abroad

Open source threat intelligence report | Portfolio work sample

Coverage: Ukraine, Turkey, Georgia and the Dominican Republic

PEIS
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1 Executive assessment

Public sources document fraudulent call centre operations in all four countries examined. The available evidence does **not** establish a single owner or organisation operating across Ukraine, Turkey, Georgia and the Dominican Republic. Recruitment offers covering the same countries are insufficient to establish common control.

This report examines corporate records, investigative reporting, official enforcement announcements and recruitment material to distinguish documented relationships from unverified leads. It focuses on the people, companies, workplaces and recruitment functions associated with individual cases. A registered shareholder, operational manager, landlord, recruiter and ultimate recipient of proceeds may be different people.

The strongest findings are:

- **Ukraine and Georgia:** OCCRP documented historical corporate and operational links between Milton Group, Morgan Limited and related companies. Georgian prosecutors subsequently announced a criminal case involving Morgan Limited. [Z09, Z21]
- **Ukraine and Turkey:** Ukrainian police described a call centre in Turkey working with associates in Ukraine. Separately, Czech police identified a significant recruiter and trainer in Operation Bridge who had fled Ukraine for Turkey. These are distinct cases unless further evidence establishes a connection. [Z04, Z05]
- **Kyiv and Santo Domingo:** an OSCE report reproduced a recruitment advertisement listing both cities. This establishes what was advertised; it does not identify the operator or independently verify each advertised office. [Z01]
- **Named companies and individuals:** attribution is possible within particular cases. The evidence does not justify combining every name into a single list of co-conspirators.

The starting lead was a report of recruiters offering placements in the four countries. No specific recruiter profile, advertisement, domain or employer identifier was available. The result is therefore a map of documented cases and promising leads, rather than attribution of that particular recruitment offer.

The Dominican Republic remains the largest gap in the proposed cross-border connection. Public records establish local scam cases and recruitment references to Santo Domingo, but the research did not find a corporate or financial link tying those cases to the Ukrainian or Georgian operations discussed here.

Scope: public-source research only. The report contains no new field surveillance, private banking records or non-public residential addresses. Recruiters, companies and named individuals were not contacted, and no non-public accounts were used. Findings reflect the research cutoff above.

2 Evidence standards

Evidence categories are kept separate throughout the report. An official announcement establishes what an authority reported and the procedural stage described; it does not establish every allegation as proven fact.

Evidence type	What it supports	What it does not establish
Corporate register	Recorded entity, ownership, control, address or name change at a stated time	Actual operational control or criminal conduct
Police or prosecutor	Announced action, procedural status and investigative account	Guilt of every person mentioned
Court	A particular decision in a particular case	Finality unless confirmed, or guilt of unrelated parties
Investigative reporting	Findings attributed to reporting, documents, recordings or observation	Judicial confirmation of every finding
Recruitment material	What a publisher advertised or claimed	An office's existence, common ownership or unlawful activity
Analytical assessment	An interpretation of the cited material	An additional independent piece of evidence

In this report, a Ukrainian connection generally means an operation located in Ukraine or a documented link to Ukraine. It does not describe the nationality of every organiser. Several operations had international staff and management.

A registered address, rented workplace and currently active office are also different categories. An office reported in 2020 may no longer operate in 2026. Ownership of a building does not itself implicate a landlord in a tenant's fraud.

3 Recruitment patterns

The Kyiv and Santo Domingo advertisement

The OSCE's *Trafficking into Cyber Scam Operations* includes a recruitment example headed "Forex Recruitment Pipeline". It lists eight locations, including Kyiv and Santo Domingo, offers paid relocation, and advertises compensation from approximately USD 2,000 for conversion roles and USD 2,500 for retention roles, plus commission. The captured list does not, by itself, confirm the original four-country lead. [Z01, PDF page 28]

The research sample is not a complete inventory of operations. A job title, relocation package or accommodation offer alone does not establish fraud.

Comparable public recruitment

Search-index excerpts from the public profile **The Talent Hunter** advertised Istanbul, Tbilisi and Santo Domingo, among other locations, using the terms "conversion", "retention" and relocation packages. This is a comparable recruitment pattern. The research found no basis for identifying the profile as an organiser of the criminal cases examined here. Dynamic profile content and indexed excerpts also do not establish that a vacancy remains open. [Z02]

Three explanations remain possible for a recruiter advertising all four countries: a single employer with multiple offices; an intermediary serving unrelated employers; or a publisher reposting offers or listing unverified locations. Distinguishing them requires the contracting employer, company identifier, exact workplace and identity of the wage-paying entity. A matching country list is insufficient.

4 Locations identified in public sources

The following records distinguish historical workplaces, registered addresses, enforcement locations and advertised destinations. None should be treated as a personally verified active office at the research cutoff.

Country and location	Nature of record and period	Status and limitation
Ukraine, Kyiv, Mandarin Plaza	Milton Group workplace, floors 6 and 7; March 2020 investigation [Z07]	Historical reporting; present activity unconfirmed
Ukraine, Lviv, 176 Bohdana Khmelnytskoho Street	Registered address of BREIN PRO, formerly Milton Group; company 41013770; displayed extract dated 18 July 2025 [Z10]	Registration address; does not establish a call centre in the building
Georgia, Tbilisi, 13 Kavtaradze Street	A.K. Group office identified by journalists in 2025 [Z11]	Historical workplace; activity at the cutoff unconfirmed
Georgia, Tbilisi, Shartava Street	Additional workplace described in 2025 reporting [Z11]	No reliably verified building number
Georgia, Tbilisi, 68 Mirian Mepe Street, Didi Dighomi	Workplace associated with A.K. Group personnel and an RTM Import lease; follow-up reporting in 2026 [Z15, Z16]	Later reporting states the office closed; not a confirmed current branch
Turkey, Istanbul, Maslak	Call centre in a commercial building described in July 2026 enforcement reporting [Z05, Z06]	Raided premises; exact building and leasing entity not identified
Turkey, city not disclosed	Centre in a Ukrainian-Czech investment fraud case; June 2026 [Z04]	No city or street given; cannot automatically be equated with Maslak
Dominican Republic, Santo Domingo	Destination in a captured recruitment advertisement; OSCE 2026 [Z01]	Advertisement does not verify a specific office
Dominican Republic, Santiago and Puerto Plata provinces	Discovery 2.0 enforcement locations; August 2023 [Z26]	Separate documented case; no Ukrainian ownership link established

Only publicly reported commercial or enforcement locations are included. Building numbers have not been inferred from photographs. Where premises have multiple occupants, a reported connection to one tenant does not implicate the others.

5 Milton Group and Morgan Limited

The historical Kyiv operation

A 2020 international investigation described Milton Group operating from Mandarin Plaza and approaching overseas customers under several investment brands. **Jacob / Jakub Keselman** was presented as the executive head. He said the company provided information and support services and disputed the characterisation of a fraudulent operation. His response forms part of the original reporting; this account is not a court finding of guilt. [Z07]

Registered ownership and the BREIN PRO name

For Ukrainian legal entity **41013770**, Opendatabot displays a name change from **ТОВ «МІЛТОН ГРУП»** to **ТОВ «БРЕЙН ПРО»**, rendered in English as **BREIN PRO LLC**. Its history records the removal of **Irakli Dadivadze** from founder and beneficial ownership entries. The displayed record identifies **Faruk Omar** as director, sole owner and ultimate beneficial owner, with a registered address in Lviv. [Z10]

The displayed extract is dated **18 July 2025**. It should not be represented as a fresh official extract from October 2026. A change of registered owner also does not, by itself, show who controlled the brand or individual operational teams.

David Todua and Naspay

OCCRP reported that an insider described **David Todua** as a significant figure in the operation and documented his ownership of the payment platform **Naspay**, which was used for payments. OCCRP also stated that no official corporate document linked Todua to ownership of the call centre; Dadivadze appeared in the formal records. This supports a reported operational and payment connection, rather than a registry-based conclusion that Todua was the sole ultimate owner of an entire network. [Z08]

Todua denied being Milton Group's hidden owner in contemporary reporting. [Z07] Original-language Direkt36 coverage.

Morgan Limited in Georgia

OCCRP identified Ukrainian national **Natalia Plutenko** as owner of Georgia's **Morgan Limited**. It described her previous position at Ukrshid and a corporate chain involving **Vladislav Voronin**, **TOV Easy Way Group** and Dadivadze, alongside shared working and organisational relationships. These connections are stronger than a resemblance between job advertisements. They are historical findings reported in 2020, not a current register of Morgan Limited's owners. [Z09]

Names require careful resolution. **Yevhen Voronin**, who also appears in the history of the Ukrainian entity, cannot automatically be equated with **Vladislav Voronin** in a different corporate branch.

On **6 September 2024**, Georgian prosecutors announced a case concerning a group allegedly operating through Morgan Limited in **2019-2021**. They described the company as founded by a Ukrainian citizen, reported four arrests and additional charges, and cited approximately **EUR 3.17 million** obtained from people in Germany, Slovenia and Slovakia. This is the prosecution's account; a final judgment was not verified in this research. [Z21]

Contested claims involving David Kezerashvili

The same prosecution announcement described payments under investigation to accounts associated with **David Kezerashvili**. That statement does not establish that he directed all the centres. His lawyers subsequently announced a BBC settlement involving the withdrawal of four publications, an undertaking not to repeat the disputed allegations and payment of legal costs. Their statement is a party's account of a settlement, not a determination of every separate criminal case. This report does not identify Kezerashvili as a proven head of the network. [Z21, Z22]

6 A.K. Group in Georgia

Formal ownership and operational management

Studio Monitori reported that **A.K. Group** was incorporated on **26 April 2021**, with **Meri Shotadze** recorded as sole owner and director. Journalists associated her with the internal name **Kseniya / Ksenia Koen**. These details derive from the registry and internal material examined by the journalists; a fresh direct company extract was not obtained for this research. [Z12]

According to OCCRP, internal communications showed Shotadze reporting to **Akaki Kevkhishvili**, whose name did not appear in formal ownership records. It remained unclear whether he was the highest-level organiser or answered to someone else. The investigation described approximately 85 workers and support personnel, not a complete ownership structure. [Z13]

OCCRP and its partners calculated approximately **USD 35.3 million from more than 6,100 people between May 2022 and February 2025** from internal records. These figures are findings from the analysed data, rather than audited company accounts or a judicial damages calculation verified in this report. [Z14]

Offices and the RTM Import lease

Monitori identified workplaces at **13 Kavtaradze Street**, on **Shartava Street** and in the Dighomi area of Tbilisi. The reporting provides a more precise address for the first site; no building number is added for Shartava. [Z11]

Follow-up reporting on **68 Mirian Mepe Street** described a workspace lease dated **2 November 2022** involving **RTM Import**. It identified **Irakli Kvlividze**, who had personnel links to Kevkhishvili, as the company's owner. Journalists compared lease documents with A.K. Group's internal payments. A landlord representative said the original tenant had left, leaving the relationship between the historical lease and the later operation unresolved. [Z15]

A subsequent closure matters to the location assessment. JAMnews reported on **4 August 2026**, following Monitori's work, that the Mirian Mepe office closed after advance notice of the reporting and that the premises were offered for rent. This address cannot be presented as a verified current scam centre. The article also described earlier employment links for the two managers at **100 Marketing Solutions**. That is a lead concerning personnel continuity, not proof that the company currently owns A.K. Group. [Z16]

Finance personnel and Intek Systems

OCCRP identified **Nika Basaria**, using the internal name **Neal Cassidy**, and **Ketevan Malashkhia**, using **Ashley Moriarty**, among the financial staff. Leaked material linked them to the use of British company **Intek Systems Limited** and service payments. Registered owner **Jevgenij Roscenkov** denied a connection between the company and the scam centre and described its business as web development. [Z17]

Independent corporate record check

The research also checked the primary Companies House record for the exact British entity. The company identifier is essential to avoid confusing it with similarly named businesses. [Z18, Z19]

Field	Companies House record
Legal name	INTEK SYSTEMS LIMITED
Company number	**12321489**
Incorporated	19 November 2019
Dissolved	**14 January 2025**
Recorded person with significant control	**Jevgenij Roscenkov**; recorded control of at least 75%
Previous person with significant control	**Oleksandr Nesterenko**; recorded control ceased on 29 September 2021

The register establishes the entity's formal identity and recorded control. It does not implicate every historical owner in the conduct reported by journalists. No separate evidence of Nesterenko's participation in fraud was identified.

Technology providers and impersonated brands

OCCRP linked Intek to **admiralsfx.org** and the use of telephony provider **Squaretalk**. Squaretalk said it cooperated with investigators and had also received instructions not to disconnect accounts under investigation. Supplying a service does not itself establish a provider's participation in fraud. [Z17]

The UK Financial Conduct Authority separately warned about admiralsfx.org and related domains as clones of an authorised firm. According to the FCA, the legitimate impersonated firm is unrelated to the clone. Exact domains are therefore more useful identifiers than the word "Admiral" alone. [Z20]

7 Artur Yermolayev and the Estonian court case

The case of **Artur Yermolayev**, also transliterated as **Iermolaiev** or **Jermolajev**, has a judicial source. On **30 April 2026**, Estonia's **Harju County Court** announced a conviction in settlement proceedings for founding and leading an organisation specialising in telephone fraud. [Z23]

The indictment described a network of Ukrainian offices run from 2017 with three other men, and more than **EUR 100 million** obtained in **2019-2022**. The court reported a five-year sentence with most of the custodial term suspended, expulsion, a ten-year entry ban and a payment of **EUR 8.5 million** taken into account in the settlement.

The court explicitly stated that the decision **had not yet become final on the date of publication**. Subsequent finality was not verified. The case also does not establish ownership of offices in all four countries examined. Its findings cannot be extended to Yermolayev's father or every company with a family business connection without separate evidence.

8 Turkey and recruitment roles

Operation Bridge in Istanbul

On **3 July 2026**, Czech police announced action against an Istanbul centre, reporting **51 detainees, including six Czech citizens**, **1,173 cases** and losses exceeding **CZK 553 million**. One person detained on an international warrant was particularly relevant to recruitment. Police said the individual had fled Ukraine, changed identity, and handled recruitment, training, scripts and supervision of Czech operators in Turkey. [Z05]

The announcement did not name that person. No identity is inferred from photographs or aliases. Police also described human resources staff, technicians and people handling logistics and money transfers. The account directly supports the existence of a recruitment function in that particular suspected organisation.

Anadolu, citing Turkish prosecutors, placed the centre in a **commercial building in Maslak**, leased through intermediary companies without visible signage. It reported approximately **80 foreign nationals working at the site**. That figure describes the workplace population and should not be confused with the number detained. The reviewed report did not identify the leasing company or building number. [Z06]

The separate June 2026 case

On **30 June 2026**, Ukrainian police announced a case involving operators in Turkey and associates in Ukraine who processed funds through cryptocurrency. They reported approximately **UAH 1.6 million** in losses to Czech victims and suspicions notified to two people. The centre offered fraudulent investments and used remote access to victims' devices. [Z04]

The available material does not establish that this was Operation Bridge. Publication dates, similarities in fraud methods and reported scale are insufficient to attribute both cases to one company.

No reliable public document was identified naming a Turkish registered company owner or tenant for these workplaces. The research also found no evidence linking them to Georgia's A.K. Group or the Dominican Discovery cases.

9 Dominican Republic evidence gaps

The identity of the Dominican employer behind the initial recruitment lead remains unresolved. Three types of evidence must be kept separate.

Lead	Established information	Missing connection
Santo Domingo recruitment	A captured advertisement named the city [Z01]	Legal entity, registration number, address and independent office confirmation
Local scam operations	Dominican police documented enforcement cases [Z26]	Proof that these are the employers recruiting through the same channels
Alleged Ukrainian ownership	Not established in the reviewed material	A specific corporate, personnel or financial linking record

Discovery 2.0

Dominican police reported **25 arrests and 13 searches** in **Santiago and Puerto Plata provinces** on **6 August 2023**. The alleged scheme involved calls to older people in the United States, fabricated emergencies involving grandchildren and demands for bail money. Homeland Security Investigations and the New York City Police Department cooperated in the operation. [Z26]

This establishes a documented local criminal case, not a Ukrainian branch. The figures above follow the cited police statement; differing totals in secondary coverage have not been added together.

Companies named in the original Discovery case

In coverage of an indictment on **11 June 2023**, Listín Diario reported **46 individuals and five companies**: **Televoice International Group Sucrod, SRL**; **Rodcat Contact Center, SRL**; **Homeserve Contact Center, SRL**; **Global Comunicaciones Dominicana, GLOCODO, SRL**; and **Enmanuel Jerez y Peralta Industrial, SRL**. [Z27]

These are company names in reporting on an indictment. They are not current RNC registry extracts verified here, or confirmed employers of the recruiters in the initial lead. No corporate bridge was found between them and Milton Group, A.K. Group or the Istanbul cases.

Dominica and the Dominican Republic are different countries. An offshore registration in Dominica would not, by itself, establish a workplace in Santo Domingo.

10 Alleged protection in Operation Karfagen

Operation **Karfagen**, also rendered as **Carthage**, addresses alleged protection of call centres from investigation. It is not evidence of common ownership across the operations in this report.

On **22 October 2026**, Ukraine's **NABU and SAP** announced an additional suspicion against a former head of a department within the Prosecutor General's Office. Investigators alleged that the official communicated with representatives of illegal call centres, received payments and helped conceal the activity. The announcement cited documented unlawful benefits exceeding **UAH 1 billion**. This is an investigative allegation about benefits in a corruption case, not the total losses of call centre victims. [Z24]

Transparency International Ukraine's court-monitoring project identifies the following people in case **52026000000000295**. [Z25]

Person	Role described in the case	Qualification
Serhii Kropyva, "Kantsler"	Suspected organiser of paid protection and asset laundering	Denies guilt
Yelyzaveta Ivakhnenko, "Muza"	Suspect in the money-laundering component	Denies participation in the organisation
Serhii Kutsyi, "Kamrad"	Driver and suspect in the asset-laundering component	Not an established call centre owner
Oleksandr Dydych	Lawyer suspected in the asset-laundering component	No final conviction established here

The defence challenges the grounds for the suspicions. Amounts from different stages of the case cannot simply be added: allegedly laundered assets and received bribes are different categories. NABU's cited update did not name the newly identified suspect, so no name is supplied. None of these sources establishes that the individuals directed recruitment into the Dominican Republic.

11 Further official cases in Ukraine

The following announcements illustrate the range of separately documented operations. They should not automatically be treated as additional branches of the companies discussed above.

Announcement	Reported locations and findings	Source
16 December 2025	Dnipro, Ivano-Frankivsk and Kyiv; cross-border recruitment of approximately 100 workers, more than 400 identified victims and losses exceeding EUR 10 million	Eurojust [Z03]
23 February 2026	Three sites in Dnipro; 11 arrests, fake cryptocurrency investments and follow-up charges for purported recovery of funds	Eurojust [Z29]
29 May 2026	Kharkiv; action on 26 May, four alleged leaders arrested, and renewed targeting of people already affected by fraud	Eurojust [Z30]
2 July 2026	Kyiv; suspected fraud against US citizens and recruitment of English-speaking workers from several regions	Ukrainian police [Z28]

Eurojust explicitly describes recruitment from Czechia, Latvia, Lithuania and other countries into Ukrainian operations. International recruitment is therefore consistent with documented practices in this sector. It does not identify the particular organisation behind the initial lead.

12 Assessment of relationships

Relationship	Assessment and basis
Milton Group to BREIN PRO	Documented historical name change for Ukrainian entity 41013770; extract currency is limited [Z10]
Milton Group to Morgan Limited	Strong historical corporate and operational connection in investigative reporting [Z09]
Morgan Limited to a Georgian operation with a Ukrainian founder	Officially announced criminal case; allegations remain tied to their procedural status [Z21]
A.K. Group to Shotadze and Kevkhishvili	Formal owner according to journalists' registry checks; operational manager according to internal material [Z12, Z13]
A.K. Group to RTM Import and Mirian Mepe	Historical lease and personnel connection; subsequent closure reported [Z15, Z16]
A.K. Group to Intek Systems	Use of the British company documented in reporting; formal identity checked separately [Z17-Z19]
Ukraine to Turkey	Cooperating individuals and movement of a significant member documented in specific cases [Z04, Z05]
Kyiv to Santo Domingo	A common recruitment advertisement is documented [Z01]
A.K. Group and Milton Group as one organisation	**Not established**; reviewed material does not show identical leadership
Discovery as a Dominican branch of a Ukrainian network	**Not established**; no corporate, personnel or financial linking record
One owner across all four countries	**Not established**; the specific recruiter and employers remain unidentified

OCCRP's Scam Empire project also examined a separate Israeli-European operation and found no evidence that it shared an operator with A.K. Group. Shared software, telephone providers or similar scripts alone are unreliable indicators of common ownership. [Z13]

13 Outstanding intelligence gaps

Beneficial ownership. The research identified several historical formal owners and entity identifiers, but not a complete list of ultimate recipients of proceeds. No fresh direct official extracts for A.K. Group, Morgan Limited or RTM Import were obtained as of 23 October 2026. Names associated with these entities remain attributed to dated reporting.

Current offices. No historical address is described as a personally verified active workplace. For the Istanbul centre, the available material identifies a district and type of building, but not a reliable exact address. For Santo Domingo, even the legal entity remains unidentified.

Recruiters. Without a specific profile, it is not possible to determine whether the original lead concerns an internal hiring team, an intermediary for several companies or a reposted advertisement. A similar public offer does not establish that it is the same source.

Criminal responsibility. Each name must retain its precise procedural status. A reported suspicion is not an indictment, and an indictment is not a final conviction. The Estonian case has a court announcement of conviction, but the cited initial source did not confirm finality.

Completeness. The research does not identify everyone behind the operations. A comprehensive attribution would require non-public banking data, full investigative files and reliable identity resolution across jurisdictions. The available public evidence supports a narrower conclusion.

14 Priorities for further collection

The highest-value next input is a public identifier for the original lead: a recruitment profile or channel URL, exact advertisement, recruitment domain, company name from a contract or a named commercial building.

1. **Separate intermediary from employer.** Identify the contracting entity and registration number for each country. One recruiter may represent unrelated companies.
2. **Establish dates.** Record the advertisement date, registry extract date and proposed relocation date. An old post may no longer describe current operations.
3. **Resolve legal entities.** Compare registration numbers, authorised representatives and corporate history. A matching company name alone is insufficient.
4. **Separate registered address from workplace.** A lease or independent workplace confirmation is stronger office evidence than a registered address alone.
5. **Seek an independent linking record.** A common contracting entity, shared invoicing, reliably identified management or documented transfer between entities would support a network connection. Similar artwork or language is a weaker lead.
6. **Check the exact domain against regulator warnings.** Avoid confusing an impersonating brand with the legitimate firm whose identity it uses.

These are proposed collection steps, not claims that the relevant documents have already been obtained.

Registers for targeted follow up

Jurisdiction	Register or identifier	Verification priority
Ukraine	EDRPOU; identified entity **41013770**	Fresh official extract, ownership changes and authorised representatives. Opendatabot is an intermediary for registry data.
Georgia	NAPR Business Registry and registered entity search	Exact Georgian name, entity code, current members and directors, and historical filings
Turkey	MERSİS	First obtain a specific Turkish company name or number. "Maslak" alone is insufficient.
Dominican Republic	DGII taxpayer register, RNC	Exact business name, RNC and status. Tax registration alone does not identify the ultimate recipient of funds.
United Kingdom	Companies House, **12321489**	Historical control, dissolution and filed documents

Registry access points:

- Georgia NAPR Business Registry and registered entity search.
- Turkish Ministry of Trade description of MERSİS.
- DGII guidance for checking a company's RNC.
- Companies House record for Intek Systems Limited.

15 Source register

Source IDs connect the findings to the publications listed on the following pages. Where only search-index excerpts could be retrieved rather than the full article, that limitation is stated. All findings are subject to the stated research cutoff.

The source set combines official records with investigative reporting and recruitment material. Each supports a different type of conclusion. Register entries establish formal records; enforcement announcements describe the authorities' case; journalistic investigations provide attributed findings; and recruitment material establishes advertised claims.

Sources Z01 to Z15

Z01 OSCE | Trafficking into Cyber Scam Operations | April 2026
Research report; captured recruitment example C on PDF page 28.

Z02 The Talent Hunter | Public LinkedIn profile
Recruitment lead; dynamic content. No criminal attribution is made to the profile.

Z03 Eurojust | Fraudulent call centres in Ukraine rolled up | 16 December 2025
Primary announcement concerning Ukrainian operations and international recruitment.

Z04 National Police of Ukraine | Investment fraud affecting Czech citizens | 30 June 2026
Primary account of a centre in Turkey and associates in Ukraine.

Z05 Police of the Czech Republic | Operation Bridge | 3 July 2026
Primary announcement describing enforcement and recruitment functions.

Z06 Anadolu Agency | Istanbul call centre operation | 3 July 2026
Statements by Turkish authorities; Maslak premises and leasing through intermediaries.

Z07 Direkt36 | Investigation of the Kyiv call centre | 2 March 2020
Original investigation; Mandarin Plaza and Keselman's response. Original-language coverage also records Todua's denial.

Z08 OCCRP | Trail of Broken Lives Leads to Kyiv Call Center
Search-index excerpts concerning Todua and Naspay; full text was not retrieved during the research.

Z09 OCCRP | Web of Call-Center Scammers Reaches Into Albania Georgia
Search-index excerpts from the original investigation; historical corporate connections to Georgia.

Z10 Opendatabot | Ukrainian entity 41013770
Intermediary registry data; displayed extract dated 18 July 2025.

Z11 Studio Monitori | Meet the scammers from Georgia
Investigative reporting identifying historical workplaces.

Z12 Studio Monitori | Call centre management
Investigative reporting on incorporation and the registered owner.

Z13 OCCRP | Scam Empire explained
Project methodology, managerial relationships and the distinction between separate operations.

Z14 OCCRP | Diamonds Dior and Dubai Vacations
Internal records and the reported scale of the Georgian operation.

Z15 Studio Monitori | Continued activity and the Dighomi workplace
Follow-up investigation; RTM Import lease connection.

Sources Z16 to Z30

Z16 JAMnews | Georgian scam call centres | 4 August 2026
Follow-up reporting; closure of the Mirian Mepe workplace.

Z17 OCCRP | Despite Criminal Probe Georgian Call-Center Scammers Are Back at Work
Investigation covering Intek, financial personnel and responses from affected parties.

Z18 Companies House | Intek Systems Limited 12321489
Primary company record; identity and dissolution.

Z19 Companies House | Intek persons with significant control
Primary record of registered control and historical changes.

Z20 Financial Conduct Authority | admiralsfx.org and related clone domains
Primary regulatory warning; updated 5 June 2024. Distinguishes the clones from the legitimate firm.

Z21 Prosecutor's Office of Georgia | Morgan Limited case | 6 September 2024
Primary prosecution announcement; allegations and procedural status.

Z22 Carter-Ruck | David Kezerashvili and BBC settlement
Statement by a party's lawyers; context for disputed allegations.

Z23 Harju County Court | Artur Yermolayev | 30 April 2026
Primary court announcement of conviction; expressly not final at publication.

Z24 NABU | Operation Karfagen update | 22 October 2026
Most recent official update used in the research.

Z25 Transparency International Ukraine | Case 52026000000000295
Court monitoring; names, procedural status and defence positions.

Z26 Dominican National Police | Discovery 2.0 | 6 August 2023
Primary enforcement account, including arrest and search totals.

Z27 Listín Diario | Discovery indictment | 11 June 2023
Reporting on the indictment and five named companies.

Z28 National Police of Ukraine | Kyiv centre targeting US citizens | 2 July 2026
Primary account of a Kyiv operation with international personnel.

Z29 Eurojust | Eleven arrests during actions against a fraudulent call centre | 23 February 2026
Primary announcement concerning three Dnipro workplaces.

Z30 Eurojust | Scam call centre shut down | 29 May 2026
Primary account of the Kharkiv case.